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                The Non-Gradability of 'Know' is not a Viable 
                           Argument against Contextualism	
    In his Knowledge and Practical Interests,1 Jason Stanley argues against contextualism by way of (among others) arguing that 'know' is not context-dependent. One main argument is that context-dependent expressions (e.g., 'flat', 'tall') are gradable, allowing for comparable constructions such as 'taller than' and for appending 'very', as in 'very tall' – but this doesn't hold for 'know': It's infelicitous to say 'x knows that p more than y knows that p', or 'x very knows that p' (or 'x knower that p than y', or 'x knows that p more than y does'). If 'know' is not context-dependent, then contextualism is undermined.
    I argue that 'know' is only partly gradable – it allows for some comparisons. It's being only partly gradable (rather than fully gradable) is explained not by its being not context-dependent,2 but rather by its multi-parametrical character. Thus, there are some gradable constructions with 'know' that are acceptable, such as: x's knowledge that p became more and more robust as she gathered more evidence in favor of p'; or: 'x now knows that p much better than he did a year ago, since in the meantime he was exposed to various compelling arguments in favor of 'p'; or: 'x knows that p very well, and better than y does'.3 Yet I argue that 'know' is just not fully gradable – by contrast to 'entirely not gradable': it is only partially gradable. Thus, employing the locution 'x's knowledge that p is more robust than y's', or 'It is more robust now than before', go a long way towards considerable gradability.
    So the right explanation for this non-full-gradability of 'know', I suggest, is not its being non-context-dependent (even if one concedes that it is).4 First off, on the face of it, Stanley's argument suffers from the weakness of the very form of his argument. If other, even if all other, context-dependent expressions exhibit gradability, this doesn't imply that 'know' is not context-dependent, on the assumption that it's not gradable, since it's possible that 'know' is a context-dependent term of a different sort: All that such an argument would show is that 'know' is not like the other context-dependent expressions, which leave room for the possibility that it is an exceptional context-dependent expression. Even if it's the only context-dependent term that doesn't exhibit the feature of gradability common to all other context-dependent expressions, this is entirely consistent with there being two (or more) different types of context-dependent expressions, 'know' being of one such type.5 
    But as I argued, the main feature, that underpins the non-full-gradability of 'know' is that 'know' is a multi-paramterical term. That is, its truth-conditions involve different features, or parameters, which are scalar in character,6 each of which being thus fully gradable.7 Thus, on almost all analyses of knowledge, sufficient confidence, or belief, are considered as necessary conditions for knowledge and by most as constituents of knowledge.8 Yet various common and less common interesting analyses of knowledge, most with considerable appeal and supporters, bring out other scalar features as conditions for knowledge (and, as such, as candidates for being constituents of knowledge). In particular, being reliable (under the circumstances, perhaps relative to a process, etc.) is a gradable predicate,9 allowing for one process to be more reliable than another (perhaps with some relativization). Nozick's analysis of knowledge requires two counterfactual conditions in addition to true belief, each with its own arguably gradable character: If the truth-conditions of counterfactuals supervene on their associated so-called objective counterfactual probability, as I have argued,10 then counterfactuals may be more or less 'robust', or more or less assertible,11 varying with different degrees of this counterfactual probability (so long as it's above the requisite threshold). More traditional justificational analyses of knowledge require both belief as well as sufficient justification. Even though, I claim, justification is not fully gradable, it is gradable to a large extent,12 introducing a different gradable parameter into the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions.13  Thus, justification, like knowledge, is also a multi-parametrical notion: It requires sufficient well-foundedness of premises, sufficient strength of the inferences involved,14 and may vary in degrees of complexity vs. simplicity that may be considered to impact the degree of justification conferred, etc. So justification is also, like knowledge, not fully gradable, and for the same reason – that it is a multi-parametrical notion, and yet, again like knowledge, it is partly gradable, allowing for partial comparability.15
   And indeed, in cases without dominance there isn't comparability between the justifications of two beliefs by two subjects, or two beliefs by one subject (or one belief by two subjects). That is, in a case of a multi-parametrical notion, which features various gradable constituents, one constituent may have a higher value (or degree) than another, but with a reverse situation for another feature. This is a case of non-dominance. If, on the other hand, all such constituents in one case have higher values or degrees than their corresponding features in the other case (the other subject, or the other belief), then there is outright dominance, which allows for outright comparability and gradability. 
   Further, for an epistemically rational subject, the subject's degree of belief must be in sufficient sync with other components of knowledge, such as – varying with one's favorite account of knowledge – degree of reliability (as accessible to the subject), or one's evidence, or the degree of internal justification that the subject has for 'p', or the degree of warranted indicativity that the subject's belief that p holds vis-à-vis 'p'.16 More specifically, for an epistemically rational subject who knows that p, the subject's degree of belief, which must be higher than the threshold of confidence requisite for knowledge, be supported by, say, one's subjective epistemic position, or one's accessed evidence. (Note that even though an epistemic norm requires that one's confidence that p be commensurable with one's subjective epistemic position17 vis-à-vis p (or, e.g., one's available accessed evidence for 'p'), it's often the case that subjects don't satisfy this condition. Yet having various unwarranted degrees of confidence need not undermine their knowledge that p – whether it's overconfidence or under-confidence, so long as they are above the threshold for confidence requisite for knowledge, and their accessed evidence support a degree of confidence above the threshold requisite for knowledge.) Now if two subjects know that p, one with an appropriate degree of confidence for 'p' and the other with under-confidence (vis-à-vis his subjective epistemic position – say, his available accessed evidence, where he would be warranted to have a higher confidence) but which is still above the threshold requisite for confidence suitable for 'know', the first subject's knowledge can be held to be more robust than that of the other. One may perhaps also say that the first subject knows that p better than the other. Robustness of knowledge that p may also reflect the degree of one's epistemic grounding for 'p'18 (which may reflect a sense of a higher or lower quality of one's knowledge). 
   Yet quality in general, and robustness of knowledge that p in particular, may be higher or lower along different dimensions, therefore reflecting knowledge as a multi-parametrical notion. Quality (or robustness) of knowledge, as in the case of justification, may be better or worse (for quality) or higher or lower (for robustness) – even when higher than the threshold requisite for knowledge. This quality (or robustness) depends on the values or grades of different components of the knowledge or the justification, such as, in the case of classical notion of justification, the well-foundedness of the premises, the strength of the inferential relations in it, the overall probability that it confers on 'p', etc. Note that if, as many hold, justification is a component of knowledge, and justification is a multi-parametrical notion, therefore so is knowledge: Being multi-parametrical is an inherited feature: if one concept has another concept as a constituent of it, and the latter is multi-parametrical, so is the first.19 (I argue that indicativity is also multi-parametrical, which, on an indicativity analysis of knowledge, yields that knowledge is also multi-parametrical – even without taking into account other components of knowledge such as confidence (or degree of belief).20) 
    That knowledge is multi-parametrical is also evident when one keeps in mind the diversity of one's sources for knowledge that p (for a particular item of knowledge that p) – perceptual, testimonial, inferential, etc., which may vary in strength. So one subject may know that p better than another subject, while both know that p, in one mode but not in another, in which case there is no dominance – e.g., when the first subject's perceptual knowledge is more robust than the perceptual knowledge of the other, whereas the testimonial knowledge of the other is more robust than the testimonial knowledge of the first. This would be another case of partial gradability due to multiple parameters that characterize knowledge. 
    It's inevitable that a concept, such as the one that underpins the term 'know', hinging on more than one partly or fully parametrical constituents, leads to non-full gradability for the term.21 This is so since two different instances of the term, e.g., two cases of knowledge, may exhibit degrees of such parameters that, even though they are above their requisite thresholds, they do not yield dominance. There is dominance of one case over another when all requisite parameters in one case have higher values or degrees than their counterparts in the other case. But in various cases, one parameter in one case may have a higher degree than its correlate in the other case, whereas another parameter in the first case would have a lower degree than its correlate in the other case.
   Thus, assume that both x and y know that p, but that x and y have different degrees of evidential support for 'p' – x has a higher degree, yet both pass the threshold requisite for knowledge for evidential support. Yet assume that y has higher confidence that p than x does – while both degrees of confidence are above the threshold requisite for knowledge, and their respective (accessible, or accessed) evidence yield warrant for confidence about the requisite threshold for knowledge. But assume that x's degree of confidence is lower than would be warranted in terms of the evidence accessed by him, at least to a sufficiently minor deviation from the appropriate range.22 In this case x fares better against y in the respect of evidential support, whereas y fares better than x vis-à-vis knowing that p in the respect of a high and appropriate confidence level. So in one respect, x knows that p 'better' than y, whereas in another respect, y knows that p 'better' than x. Yet overall, we need not be in a position to rank how well they know that p in comparison to each other, since these two parameters in their case operate comparatively in opposite directions. Hence their knowledge need not be outright comparable, and need not allow for comparative grading. 




1. Oxford University Press, 2005.
2. I don't need to commit myself here to the context-dependence of 'know'.
3. Thus, it is generally agreed that if x saw y in clear conditions, he can be considered to know that y is around better than z does, who heard y telling him that but who has no other supporting information, and for whom x is not a highly reliable source, though sufficiently reliable for transmitting knowledge.
4. I myself am not a proponent of epistemic contextualism. But the point is that being multi-parametrical precludes full gradability for a term even if it were context-dependent. Thus, consider the term 'high-and-flat' – construed as one predicate. It's obviously context dependence, due to both of its components' being so: Take first a context where a certain plane (in an altitude up in the mountains) yields that it's high and flat, and then a context where it's not flat. But it is not fully gradable, since it is multi-parametrical – it has two single-parametrical constituents: Two such planes may be such that one would be higher than the other but less flat than the other. 
5. And indeed, in view of the argument I offer below, one is invited to search for potential other kindred expressions to 'know' in terms of how gradable they are. Consider 'see that p': it allows for gradable cases, and in at least a prominent (if not the prominent) sense of 'see', seeing that p implies knowing that p. One person can see that there is a tree in front of them better than another person (e.g., if the second person's glasses are less clean) – this is a natural construction (even though 'robust seeing' is not felicitous). If 'know' is a main (though, of course, not the only) ingredient of 'see', it would be hard to see how 'see' can be gradable without 'know' being so – at least when it comes to partial gradability, which is all I argue for for 'know'.
6. It's enough for our purposes that at least some are.
7. With, I submit, with thresholds, which characterize scalar features.
8. Williamson notwithstanding. 
9. At least largely, even if not always.
10. "Counterfactual Revisited", manuscript, 2007.
11. At least in the sense of externalist assertibility. But under this conception of counterfactuals, their projected subjective probability may be taken to underpin their internalist assertibility for a speaker at a time. For the notions of internalist/exteralist assertibility, see my "From Knowledge as Indicativity to Soft Invariantism", and "A Plethora of Intermediates in the Internal/External Spectrum".
12. Of course, since I argue for partial gradability, gradability may well come in degrees – in token cases of gradability. That is, partial gradability allows for token cases of non-gradability, but of other token cases of gradability, and the latter may well allow of degrees.
13. At least partly, but to a considerable extent.
14. That can be assessed by the conditional probability conferred on the conclusion by the premises.
15. That is, a relation is partial if it is defined, or has a determinate outcome (or value, if a function is considered), but not in all instances.
16. That is, a rational degree of belief must be commensurable with other ingredients of knowledge. Regarding indicativity, it is also, like knowledge and justification, not a single parametrical notion. 'Warranted indicativity' (in one sense – the sense used here) is the degree of indicativity warranted by the information the subject possesses; see my "A Probabilistic Theory of Knowledge", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, January, 2006. 
17. Subjective epistemic position is one's epistemic position as warranted by the subject's information, which may of course be different than his objective epistemic position in various ways.
18. Or justification for 'p', or reliability, etc.
19. Thus, when the different parameters are not aligned, as in a case without dominance, there need not be a determinate degree of knowledge (unless, of course, one could establish a canonical, or standard, way of weighing the different parameters against each other, and in the case of justification and of knowledge, for all we can tell, there isn't).  
20. Note that even the condition of Truth may allow for degrees in terms of accuracy. Sufficiently high accuracy is required for knowledge, but not complete accuracy: some deviations may be acceptable. One may know that a child is 10 years old even if the child is 10 years old, nine months, 3 days, 15 hours and 3 minutes. One may argue (and this may well depend on interests and purposes) that more accurate knowledge is superior to less accurate one – even if the latter qualifies as knowledge, if, e.g., the difference in accuracy is pertinent to the needs at hand.
21. Assuming, again, that there is no conventional, or settled, way of weighing the different parameters against each other. 
22. I would hold that even major deviations of this sort need not undermine their knowledge that p (so long as the degrees of confidence in question are above the threshold requisite for knowledge). If the degree of confidence is below this threshold, while the other conditions for knowledge hold, one is in a position to know, even if one doesn't know.
23. Or at least gives high credence to its being so.


